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 In the following article on the basis of Agamben’s and Arendt’s 
philosophical tradition the idea of authority will be examined and interpreted 
in the light of the Agamben’s most provocative and crucial concept-idea of 
Homo Sacer. Genuine understanding of the concept will be attempted by 
using genealogical and hermeneutical method. Despite the historical and 
philosophical richness and depth of material, Arendt’s investigation lacks 
precise definition of the term and also nothing is said about the place and 
function of authority in modern social and political context. Arendt confines 
herself with historical elucidation and negative representation of authority. 
She tells more about what was not its meaning, rather defining it in positive 
terms. However, opposite can be said on Giorgio Agamben. Methodological 
resemblance of authors is evident, both chose archeological and historical 
form of inquiry, but as Agamben characterized his attitude, his aim was to 
develop the problematic thought and to say what remains unsaid and 
concealed in other’s writings without any ambition of fulfilling it. Therefore, 
we can interpret the notions of authority and power, as they are mixed with 
each other in the sovereign’s figure of indifference.  
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Introduction 
 For the Greek mythological and philosophical tradition the rejection 
or killing of the father was not so strange and unconceivable theoretical 
event. It will be enough to recall Oedipus and Plato’s “Sophist”, in which 
Parmenides represents symbolic image of father, who then becomes the 
object of murder and overcoming. In political organizational structure and 
everyday life of Roman Empire metaphorical figure of father as legislator 
was founded by sacral perception of tradition and past. What links the 
concepts of domination and authority with the name of the father? Father 
was deemed as a head of household and a person who gave a command, also 
he is a subject who bears culturally accumulated form of oppressive power. 
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How is it possible and relevant to associate the pre-political domination and 
power of the father with the notion of “authority”, which according to 
Hannah Arendt is effaced from the modern political and social context?  In 
the fundamental reflections on nature of political and on the forms of 
domination, Max Weber had already emphasized that without mutual 
expectations and recognition, power of the ruler would not have been a 
legitimate.  Binary opposition of domination and obedience thus have some 
correlation with each other. This twofold structure reveals itself not only in 
the political modus of the human being, rather in the microstructure of 
family life, in which the recognition of “father“ returns us in the inauthentic 
infantilism of pre-enlightenment period. By this chronological and temporal 
threshold one can easily identify the Kantian definition of enlightenment, as 
man’s emergence from self-imposed immaturity, in which the subject is 
unable to use its own reason and understanding and is guided by external 
force.  
       The power of the father in family is not conditioned by the legal 
right, rather as one of the most politically organized people in history called 
it, by the “authority”.  The “supreme” figure of the father is constructed and 
nourished by both, personal and impersonal aspects of authority. What 
differentiates authority and legal power from each other? Or both are 
incorporated and interconnected in sovereign’s figure, which can be 
described in terms of Carl Schmitt, as he who makes the decision on the state 
of exception (Ausnahmezustand).57 Concerning this first sentence from the 
“political theology” written by Carl Schmitt, one can say that both 
archeology and eschatology, or the beginning and the end, as an ultimate 
definition of sovereignty is already given in a very opening words. Sovereign 
at the same time is outside and inside of law. By declaring the state of 
exception, sovereign’s decision temporally suspends the legal order, which 
endows and provides the sovereign with such a right and instrument. 
Therefore legal order contains in itself self-destructive, or self-suspended 
possibility. Law can generate from itself its own double, or more precisely its 
own opposite. In this context, paradoxically sovereign’s figure is an 
embodiment of zero point of indifference, in which legal order or the system 
of norms and decision are mixed and linked together. 
 
Hannah Arendt on authority 
 Hannah Arendt’s text “What is authority” begins with preliminary 
consideration of what is not an authority and to which one should not 
identify it. “Since authority always demands obedience, it is commonly 
                                                            
57 See on this Schmitt Carl. Politische Theologie: Vier kapitel zur Lehre von der 
Souveränität. Berlin. Duncker & Humblot. 2009. 
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mistaken for some form of power or violence. Yet authority precludes the use 
of external means of coercion where force is used, authority itself has failed! 
Authority, on the other hand, is incompatible with persuasion, which 
presupposes equality and works through a process of argumentation. (Where 
arguments are used, authority is left in abeyance. Against the egalitarian 
order of persuasion stands the authoritarian order, which is always 
hierarchical”. [H. Arendt 2000: 463].   How is it possible and in what way 
should authority be defined, which is not characterized by using of physical 
force and also it is not based on the implicit desire of obedience by the 
construction of persuasive logical arguments. Hannah Arendt in her works 
also criticizes at that time relatively new functionalist approach. The specific 
sign of functionalist way of thinking is possibility of replacement of one 
element for another within the given system or structure. In this case we 
should recall Walter Benjamin’s essay “Capitalism as a new religion”, in 
which capitalistic economic and political system represents profaned or 
secularized version of religious belief. And Arendt’s own example, which is 
intended for refusing of functionalist understanding of authority; “The same 
argument is frequently used with respect to authority: if violence fulfills the 
same function as authority-namely, makes people obey-then violence is 
authority”. [H. Arendt 2000:471]. Following Arendt’s critical reception of 
functionalism, one can easily conclude, that equalization of communism or 
capitalism with worldly religious experience, is an instrument for the 
construction of surrogate forms of ritual and believe practices. Which by the 
force of analogue express the nature and necessity of religion itself, rather 
pointing out on its profane double. Beyond Arendtian critique of 
functionalism emerges the need of localization and desire of naming the all 
subjects. This theoretical gesture is opposed to poststructuralist interpretation 
of derivative, polyvalent and multiple sign. Fragmented and differentiated 
picture of social reality and being in general is constructed by the metaphor 
of itinerary tourist, who does not have any fixed ultimate dwelling place or 
living house.58 In the postmodern condition according to Zygmunt Bauman 
nothing is solid and unchanged, moreover everything has fluctuating liquid 
feature, which can take any desired form and then deformed, transgressed 
itself.                                                              
 Greeks had a rich political experience, but they did not have the 
notion and specific word describing what Romans understood by the term of 
authority. In ancient Greece sharp demarcation line was drawn between 
public and private spaces. The word οἰκονομία designated the private 
dimension of the household, which was ruled by δεσπότης. It is a very 
                                                            
58 See on this Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences. Columbia 
University Press, 1998. 
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similar to Hegelian master-slave dialectic, the master possessing coercive 
“power” on other family members and slaves could not be considered as free 
man. “And the master, according to Greek common opinion (which was still 
blissfully unaware of Hegelian dialectics), was not free when he moved 
among his slaves; his freedom consisted in his ability to leave the sphere of 
the household altogether and to move among his equals, freemen. Hence, 
neither the despot nor the tyrant, the one moving among slaves, the other 
among subjects, could be called a free man.” [H. Arendt 2000: 473-474]. 
Therefore according to Arendt one already knows that authority should not 
be compared to the forms of coercion and persuasion. Thus despot, who was 
a head of the family, did not possess an authority, which is still undefined 
and stays in obscurity.  
 
Auctoritas and the state of exception 
 Giorgio Agamben in his book “State of exception” making 
genealogical analysis of authority (auctoritas) and power (potestas) 
unequivocally refers to the Arendt’s above mentioned text. Both, in their 
writings cited the words of ancient Roman historian Dio Cassius59, who 
indicated on the impossibility of the simple translation of the Latin word 
auctoritas into Greek language.60  According to Agamben’s interpretation, 
Dio did not intend to demonstrate specific Roman character and origin of 
auctoritas, rather its linguistic application and complexity of translation, 
impossibility of reduction on the one meaning. 
 Etymological and hermeneutical analysis of the concept will unfold 
new horizons of meaning and decipher original root of auctoritas. Both 
philosophers in their investigations stated that, auctoritas is derived from the 
Latin word “augere”, which means “to augment”, “to increase”. Agamben 
also cited the statement from Benveniste, to whom “augeo” also implies the 
creative act or production.61 Presumably the words such as “author”, “actor”, 
“authorizations” have been derived from this common linguistic element. 
But, what connects genealogy of auctoritas with the state of exception and 
with the sovereign decision? In order to uncover the secret meaning of 
authority and its connection to the state of exception, some preliminary 
                                                            
59 It should be emphasized that Arendt quotes these words from Theodor Mommsen’s book 
“Romisches Staatsrecht. 
60 “Hellenisai auto kathapax adunaton esti”. According to Agamben by these words Dio did 
not want to say that the word auctoritas could not be rendered in Greek at all. Agamben 
thinks that, auctoritas due the semantic richness should be translated differently, according 
to the context. See the page 75.  Agamben G. State of Exception. Chicago. The University of 
Chicago Press. 2005. 
61 See on this Agamben G. State of Exception. Chicago. The University of Chicago Press. 
2005. 
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historical remarks in needed.  The remote structural analogue and 
prefiguration of the state of exception is Roman juridical and legal notion of 
“iustitium”. For the contemporary citizen of constitutional-legal state this 
word would not be the vague and obscure due to its direct connection to the 
modern notion of justice. However, initial meaning and usage of the concept 
would not be so usual and common. The notion of “iustitium” played a 
significant role and had a special function in the political life of Romans. 
Original denotation of “iustitium” was the temporal suspension of law and 
interruption of all legal procedures and social affairs. This extreme decision 
has been made by senate or magistrates on the basis of external threat or 
social disorder. Senate taking into account existed political and social 
constellation, declared the so called “Senatus Consultum Ultimum” or the 
final decree of the senate. This formula provided consuls with specific rights 
for the sake of the protection of the state. Senate’s announcement can be 
considered as transgression of the legal order, which creates extra juridical 
space. In this paradoxical situation Senate’s final decision can be counted as 
identical to law, or more precisely it has the same force of law without being 
legal element. However, following Agamben we also have to pose the 
questions on the source of the right of senate’s decision. Who or what 
bestowed senate with such a powerful weapon? Senates function and 
privilege position in Rome is not described in terms of imperium or potestas, 
rather they were called as “auctoritas patrum”. According to Agamben, in the 
Roman family structure auctoritas was counted as an exclusive right of the 
father of the family (pater familias). Asymmetrical and hierarchical attitude 
of family members towards the father indicated on their limited civil rights 
and dependence on the legally self-sufficient figure of the father. “In the 
sphere of private law, auctoritas is the property of the auctor, that is, the 
person Sui iuris (the pater familias) who intervenes—pronouncing the 
technical formula auctor fio [I am made auctor]—in order to confer legal 
validity on the act of a subject who cannot independently bring a legally 
valid act into being. Thus, the auctoritas of the tutor makes valid the act of 
one who lacks this capacity, and the auctoritas of the father “authorizes”—
that is, makes valid—the marriage of the son in potestate.” [G. Agamben 
2005: 76]. 
 Genuine instrumental function of the state of exception is the 
construction of legal void and zero degree of order in general. In which 
meta-juridical status of the sovereign is revealed. Moreover, if one make the 
step further we will be able to conclude, that sovereign has an intention of 
producing docile bio-political bodices and as Michel Foucault would 
expressed it, decide on their live and death.  
 For Carl Schmitt, the source of legitimation of sovereign is the 
transcendent Christian God. In “Political Theology” paradox of sovereignty 
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will remain unresolved by using secular and legal categories, because 
founding and constituting power of sovereignty is metaphysical in itself.  
Sovereign at the same time is excluded from and included in the legal 
system. For Carl Schmitt “The rule proves nothing; the exception proves 
everything”,62 [C. Schmitt. 2009: 21]. Or exception is a perfect example or 
model through which one can measure and examine the law. Exemplary 
character of the sovereign would be clearly seen if we recall another crucial 
text of Agamben, in which he wrote that, “One concept that escapes the 
antinomy of the universal and the particular has long been familiar to us: the 
example”. [G. Agamben 1993; 9]. 
 Therefore, structural asymmetry and tension between auctoritas and 
potestas is clear. Senate possessed auctoritas, or something, which can be 
associated with virtue. By having at the disposal this status, one could 
without any impediment temporally suspend the functioning of legal power 
(potestas). As Theodor Mommsen described it, auctoritas is “less than an 
order and more than a counsel”. [G. Agamben 2005: 78]. 
 However, this binary opposition is conflated in the figure of the 
sovereign, who creates the state of exception and cancels the deliberative and 
obligatory force of law. By declaring the state of exception, sovereign 
represents the zone of indifference, in which auctoritas and potestas are 
intertwined.  
  In this context we should introduce the concept of “homo sacer”, 
which was the obscure figure of archaic Roman law and was actualized and 
reinvented by Giorgio Agamben, according to whom, homo sacer was 
banned and excluded from the legal system, therefore his very existence have 
been reduced to bare life63.  Homo sacer could be killed without punishment 
and his involvement in sacrificial rituals was also prohibited. This form of 
life is characterized as an absence of legal system and specific rights of 
human. However as Agamben stated, by exclusion from legal order, homo 
sacer is included in it. It is something like exclusive inclusion through which 
sovereign maintains the connection or control over him. Agamben cited the 
words of Pompeus Festus according to which “The sacred man is the one 
whom the people have judged on account of a crime. It is not permitted to 
sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned for homicide; 
in the first tribunitian law, in fact, it is noted that “if someone kills the one 
who is sacred according to the plebiscite, it will not be considered 
homicide.” This is why it is customary for a bad or impure man to be called 
                                                            
62 “Die Ausnahme ist interessanter als der Normalfall. Das Normale beweist nichts, die 
Ausnahme beweist alles.” 
63 Bare life is crucial concept for Agamben, which corresponds to Greek term of “Zoe” or 
common life for all in general and not to “bios” which means politically qualified life of 
human being. Agamben himself took the term from Walter Benjamin’s essay on violence.  
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sacred.“ [G. Agamben 1998: 47].  Homo sacer was a biopolitical body, 
whose  life  after excomunication was thrown into the state of exception, or 
in the dimension of indifference.  Symbolic bodies of homo sacer and the 
sovereign structurally and functonally are very similar, if not identical at all. 
The figure of the sovereign is a substance representing the ultimate point of 
indifference. In its symbolical embodimment  difference between legal 
power (potestas) and authority (auctoritas) dissapears.  As Agamben 
demonstrates it by recalling  the case of Augustus64,  who shared the power 
with other magistaretes, but at the same time  exceeded them due to the 
possession of auctoritas65.  The bare life of homo sacer and the sovereing is 
paradoxically tied together. For the sovereign all human beings potentially 
are homo sacers and vice versa, for the later, all other humans are potential 
sovereigns, which can decide on their life and death. However,  despite this 
analogue the question concerning the essence of authory remains 
unanswered and open for further interoggation and exploration. Therefore 
one should  pose  another problematic aspect about paradoxical similarity of 
these figures. If sovereing represenst no difference between authority 
(auctorita) and power (potestas), how potential enemies of homo sacer have 
to be treated and defined. Do they have at their disposal legal power as well 
as authority? The answer is negative due to the fact that it is very 
complicated to check and verify on whom we are speaking, who wants to 
harm or kill the homo sacer? Is he a person from acknowledged legal or 
social system or he is also an inhabitant of the space of indiffrence, of bare 
life, of the state of exception? Only after knowing this, one could guess,  this 
potential sovereign for homo sacer has potestas or auctoritas,  or has only 
bare need and desire of violence. 
 
Conclusion 
 Giorgio Agamben’s diagnosis of modern political life is extremely 
radical, however it can be said that his reflections serves for unmasking and 
deciphering hidden foundations of modern political power.  He claimed that 
we live under the undeclared but constant state of exception, which he is 
considering as ruling paradigm and as a new nomos of political life. Giorgio 
Agamben’s critique of modernity stands very close to Arendt’s own 
description of its crisis. Arendt’s thesis concerning the disappearance of 
authority from modern world is linked to her another theoretical intuition, 
that the modern world is characterized by the “rise of the social” and 
declining of political sphere. From this perspective we can conclude that the 
                                                            
64 It can be clearly seen that Augustus and auctoritas, both are derived from same 
etymological root, “ augere” 
65 See on this Agamben G. State of Exception. Chicago. The University of Chicago Press. 
2005. 
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core idea of authority is possible and feasible only in the public political 
realm of intersubjective discursive practices. It would be clearer if we recall 
the distinction between household and public life in polis in which in 
contrast to former, freedom can be attained by the citizens.  Giorgio 
Agamben did not suggest his own view on current position of authority. 
However, relying on his theoretical reflections, it will be legitimate to 
suppose that he shares Arendt’s theory. In conclusion one remark should be 
made, that we are facing not a destruction but deconstruction of authority, 
which is reinvented and transformed again and again without completion. 
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